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Abstract
Self-Help Groups (SHGs) create a platform that allows women to meet on a weekly basis to
save and to take loans if needed. Strict records of all saving and lending is important, both
to avoid conicts in the group and to obtain access to bank loans. Accounting is done either
internally by a group member or externally by another villager. Economic theory suggests
that repeated interaction between individuals can help to build social capital. However,
in the context of these SHGs, the presence of an, often male, external accountant might
hamper this process. Using rst hand data on SHGs in Northern India, I nd that repeated
interaction is more likely to create non-nancial benets in the form of mutual assistance
and collective action when there is no external involvement. However, these benets come
at a cost, as SHGs with internal accountants distribute nancial benets more unequally
and the accountants themselves receive larger shares than the other members of the groups.
I provide evidence that the larger shares cannot be explained as a compensation for better
nancial performance, but that some form of elite capture occurs. Although this implies
that an internal accountant is more expensive than an external accountant, there is no
evidence that groups with internal accountants are less stable. Members are not more
likely to leave groups, possibly because the loss in nancial benets is outweighed by the
gain in non-nancial benets.
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The micronance sector in India has emerged as the largest in the world. Self-Help Groups
(SHGs) formed by the government or NGOs are the dominant form. They covered about
97 million households by March 2010. SHGs enable the poor to build the capacity to save,
so members can pool their resources, create a group fund and give out small loans to one
another. These loans are mainly used to smooth consumption, to reduce vulnerabilities and
to nance existing livelihoods. Once SHGs develop into creditworthy institutions, they open
savings accounts in commercial banks and can apply for bank loans. These bank loans are
mainly used for livelihood and business investments. By March 2010, almost 7 million SHGs
held savings with banks, to a total value of 62 billion Rs. ($ 1.3 billion), and 4.9 million SHGs
had total outstanding loans worth 280 billion Rs. ($ 5.7 billion) (NABARD, 2011).1
Due to high transaction costs and a lack of collateral, most SHG members do not have
individual access to formal nancial institutions. SHGs act as intermediaries, which help
members to save and borrow. An accurate record of all savings and lending in the group
is important to avoid conicts, and also to get access to formal bank loans. Indeed, SHGs'
credit ratings are based on their books, which are kept by accountants. Accountants can be
either internal (a group member) or external (another villager). Although the group is jointly
responsible for credit appraisal and for enforcing saving and repayment discipline, selecting
an accountant is an important decision, as his/her work plays a key role in the functioning of
the group. Even though the SHG programme provides nancial services to almost one out of
three Indian households, there is not much known about the organization of SHGs. To the
best of my knowledge, this is the rst paper analyzing the important role of accountants.
The paper uses data from a study of 1,679 women only SHGs, with a total of 26,971
members. The accountant strategy pursued by the NGO, which created these SHGs, varied
geographically in a plausibly exogenous fashion. In Jharkhand, the practice of a cluster
accountant system, where the same, external accountant serves several groups, developed.
In Orissa and Chhattisgarh the groups were asked whether one of the members could help in
keeping the books. I exploit this, using an instrumental variables strategy, to study dierences
between groups with internal versus external accountants.
Economic theory suggests that repeated interaction between individuals can help to build
social capital. Some experimental evidence is given by Feigenberg et al. (2011). They show
that micronance clients are more likely to develop friendships and social ties if they meet more
frequently. However, they suggest that, since the scope of the meetings is nancial mediation,
micronance mainly aects economic cooperation. I nd evidence of two forms of cooperation
1For female SHGs only, NABARD gives the following details: 5.3 million SHGs held savings with banks,
to a total value of 45 billion Rs., and 3.9 million SHGs had total outstanding loans worth 230 billion Rs.
1that go beyond economic motives. First, 56% of the SHGs in the study provided assistance
to at least one of their members. The most important examples are assisting a member in
visiting a doctor and solving conicts within a member's household. Second, 46% of the groups
undertook collective actions aiming to solve problems aecting their villages. The collective
actions include visiting a government ocer to request a solution, or intervening directly. For
instance, excessive alcohol consumption, especially among men, is a problem that appears in
many villages. This can often lead to tensions within households, which SHGs would address
by visiting an ocer to request the suspension of alcohol licences, or by organizing anti-alcohol
campaigns or talking to alcohol-producing households.
There are two reasons why groups with external accountants might be less likely to spend
time on non-nancial issues. First, the external accountant is hired to keep the books. If
groups start discussing non-nancial issues, the meetings take longer and the opportunity cost
of being the accountant increases. Therefore, the external accountant might prefer the meet-
ings to remain short and concentrated on nancial issues only. Second, external accountants
are mainly men and my survey evidence suggests that the non-nancial issues are often related
to women topics. The external accountant might reveal the issues discussed to the villagers
in question, being very likely, for example, to know relatives of SHG members. By revealing
the group's intentions for undertaking action, the external accountant reduces the probability
of success, which in turn might reduce the probability the group spends time on non-nancial
issues.2 Indeed, I nd that SHGs with internal accountants are about 20 percentage points
more likely to provide mutual assistance and about 19 percentage points more likely to under-
take collective actions. Hence, the rst contribution of this paper is that repeated interaction
is more likely to strengthen social capital when there is no external involvement.
The higher probability of non-nancial benets in groups with internal accountants might
come at a nancial cost. Apart from group and bank loans, the nancial value of groups
also consists of prots as members pay interest on loans. The external accountant is not
a group member and therefore does not receive a share of loans or prots, while internal
accountants do.3 I nd that groups with internal accountants distribute the nancial benets
more unequally: the Gini coecients on the allocation of the bank loans and prots increase
by approximately 17 and 15 percentage points respectively. Within group regressions suggest
that the accountant receives 10% of bank loans and 8% of prots which are respectively 43%
and 14% larger than an equal share of 7% for all members. I consider three explanations for
this phenomenon, which, to a certain extent, I can test empirically.
2This argument is close to Glass (2004), who models outsourcing under imperfect protection of intellectual
property.
3The external accountant could receive a share indirectly, for example through a family member belonging
to the group.
2First, given that both the group's nancial value and the distribution are known to all
group members, the internal accountant might simply be compensated for a better nancial
performance. Indeed, if a group with an internal accountant generates a higher nancial value
than a group with an external accountant, it can attribute a larger share to the internal
accountant without reducing the amounts that other members receive. Therefore, I compare
the probability that SHGs obtain a bank loan, and the sizes of the bank loans, prots and
group loans between SHGs with internal accountants and external accountants. As I do not
nd signicant dierences, I conclude that groups with internal accountants do not generate
higher value than groups with external accountants, which reduces the plausibility of this
explanation.
A second explanation is related to elite capture. Elite capture occurs if powerful members -
like the accountant - take a large share of the resources. An unequal distribution, however, does
not necessarily implies that elite capture has occurred. If members have a dierent marginal
utility of money, an equal distribution of loans is not necessarily the optimal one. However,
given that the choice between an external and an internal accountant is mainly driven by the
NGO's strategy, there is no reason why members of a group with an internal accountant should
be more dierent from each other than members of a group with an external accountant. Due
to the special training that the internal accountant received, she has a particular authority
in the SHG, that is obviously related to the group's nances. Several results suggest that I
cannot exclude the possibility that the internal accountant uses her position to take some extra
benets, i.e. that some form of elite capture occurs. Firstly, I nd that internal accountants,
who are - just like external accountants - paid for keeping the books, still receive an extra
share of bank loans and prots. Secondly, I compare the total amount allocated among the
members with the size of bank loans. If SHGs allocate group funds along with the bank loan,
the group savings can be used at the discretion of the internal accountant and she can take an
even larger share. Indeed, in SHGs which allocate group funds along with the bank loan, the
internal accountant's share increases by 5.5 percentage points. This is 79% more than what
she would have received under an equal distribution. Thirdly, family members of the internal
accountant receive a slightly larger share too.
The nal possibility is that the value of the group cannot be measured in nancial terms
only. Although an internal accountant seems more expensive than an external one, there is no
evidence that SHGs with an internal accountant are less stable. Members are just as likely to
leave groups with internal accountants as external accountants in the months that follow the
distribution of bank loans and prots. Hence, the lower nancial benets seem not to increase
the rate of exit, suggesting that the non-nancial benets might be compensating them.4
4It is not rare that members leave SHGs (21%) and join other groups after leaving (23%).
3This paper makes several contributions. First, it complements the literature on the returns
to repeated social interaction by focusing on non-nancial cooperation. Second, it is related
to the literature on the importance of rules and organization in informal groups.5 Finally, my
ndings also contribute to the empirical literature on elite capture.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the SHGs created by the NGO
PRADAN, the data set, the nancial and non-nancial benets of SHGs and the selection
of accountants. Section 3 gives the empirical methodology used. Section 4 provides the
descriptive statistics. Section 5 examines whether there are dierences in the provision of
non-nancial benets, in the nancial performance and in the distribution of funds between
groups with internal accountants and groups with external accountants. It also examines
whether there is an indication of elite capture in groups with internal accountants, and nally
suggests there might be a trade-o between nancial and non-nancial benets. Section 6
contains a robustness check. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 SHGs created by PRADAN
PRADAN (Professional Assistance for Development Action) was established in Delhi in 1983.
The NGO aims to promote and strengthen the livelihoods of socio-economically disadvantaged
communities. The creation of SHGs is put forward as an eective starting point. To form
groups, eld teams rstly use secondary information to select villages where no other NGO has
worked before. Next, they organize a village meeting where they introduce SHGs as groups of
women which meet on a weekly basis to save and to give exible loans at a reasonable interest
5Among others, this literature includes Anderson and Francois (2008) who study what features of self-
sustaining groups make some choose informal structures of governance, while others choose formal ones;
Feigenberg et al. (2011) who show that the meeting frequency of micronance groups is associated with
increases in social interaction and lower default; and Field et al. (2011), who study the impact of the term
structure of micronance loans on business investments, prots and default.
6Platteau (2009) overviews this literature and considers two dierent forms. In the rst one, if preferences
are heterogeneous, village elite impose their own interests and objectives while negotiating projects with
external funding agencies. My story ts in the second form: the powerful take a larger share of the external
resources provided to the community. This holds especially for bank loans, which might be partially subsidized.
More specically, my results are close to Platteau and Gaspart (2003), who nd that leaders were allowed a
disproportionate share of benets in the form of over-invoicing and falsifying accounts, as villagers believed
that their situation would not have improved without the eorts of the leaders. I argue that SHG members do
not experience an unequal distribution as unfair because, thanks to having an internal accountant, it is more
likely that the group also provides non-nancial benets.
4rate. They motivate interested women to form groups of 10 to 20 members (PRADAN, 2005).
The formation process follows the guidelines of the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural
Development (NABARD, 1992) and the Reserve Bank of India (Reserve Bank of India, 1999).
PRADAN does not act as a micronance institution (MFI), but links the SHGs with
banks. This is possible because of the well developed banking infrastructure in India. With a
bank branch available for every 15,000 rural households, India has one of the largest banking
networks in the world (Fisher and Sriram, 2002).
2.2 Data set
The data set consists of 1,679 SHGs and 26,971 women who, at some point, have been members
of these groups. All SHGs which have been formed since the start of the program by ve eld
teams in three dierent states are surveyed, independent of whether the groups are still actively
meeting or not. The eld teams are close, but not contiguous, as can be seen from Figure 3
in the appendix. Table 1 overviews the number of SHGs and members in the data set divided
by state, district and survey period.7
Table 1: Overview data set
State District Number of SHGs Number of Members Survey Period
Orissa Mayurbhanj and Keonjhar 532 8,599 May - June 2006
Chhattisgarh Raigarh 570 8,312 January - February 2007
Jharkhand Koderma and Hazaribagh 577 10,060 March - April 2008
2.3 The nancial and non-nancial benets of SHGs
The main objective of SHGs is nancial intermediation. Firstly, SHGs build the capacity to
save so members can pool their resources, create a group fund and give out small loans to one
7Some observations are missing for four reasons: (1) In the Hazaribagh district, 33 inactive groups refused
to sit with the research team. We asked them selected questions at the group level, but did not receive any
member level information. (2) We do not have village level information for 5 SHGs. (3) A rst analysis of
the Orissa and Chhattisgarh data revealed that some important information, like the allocation of bank loans
and prots within the group, was missing. Hence, before moving to the nal state, the Orissa (September
- October 2007) and Chhattisgarh (November - December 2007) SHGs were revisited with a complementary
questionnaire. Due to problems with a private rm in Orissa, it was not possible to re-survey 63 groups. In
Chhattisgarh one SHG is not revisited. The complementary questions are available for all SHGs in Jharkhand.
(4) Some groups received bank loans, or distributed prots, but they lost the records of how the money was
distributed.
5another (henceforth group loans). Secondly, SHGs can open a savings account with a nearby
commercial bank and apply for a bank loan (henceforth bank loans). As bankers are willing
to lend to SHGs only if they believe that doing so will be protable, groups have to build
reputations through strict saving and lending practices.
Table 2 overviews the types of declared expenses by source of nancing. I use information
on 23,768 group loans and on 18,911 bank loans. Two important observations can be made.
First, bank loans give the opportunity to borrow larger amounts. Second, dierent sources of
nance are used for dierent purposes: only 22.3% of group loans are declared to be used for
business investments, compared to 80.8% of bank loans.8
Table 2: Purpose and amounts of group and bank loans
Declared purpose Group loans Bank loans
% of total number Median amount per % of total number Median amount per
of loans taken loan taken (Rs.) of loans taken loan taken (Rs.)
HOUSEHOLD NEEDS 77.7 600 19.2 2,000
Medical expenses 39.0 500 5.3 2,000
Consumer durables 21.6 700 4.8 1,300
Marriage/family events 11.6 1,000 6.4 2,500
Other personal use 3.7 1,000 1.1 2,000
Food consumption 1.8 500 1.6 1,000
BUSINESS INVESTMENTS 22.3 1,000 80.8 2,000
Purchase farm inputs 8.0 700 31.8 1,250
Business 3.3 2,000 23.3 2,500
Purchase livestock 2.4 1,600 15.5 3,000
Building repair or improvement 6.2 1,500 7.9 3,000
Machine purchase or repair 1.0 2,100 1.4 6,000
Education 1.4 1,000 0.9 1,600
For group loans, I use data from Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand only, as I do not have this information for Orissa. For
the bank loans I have information available for the three states.
SHGs also generate \prots". Members pay interest on loans and are ned when they
arrive late or do not attend meetings.9 Some SHGs derive extra prots from group activities,
such as providing midday meals in schools.
As explained in the introduction, I study two benets of SHGs that go beyond economic
motives. First, there is the aspect of mutual assistance: 56% of the groups gave assistance
to one of the members. Second, 46% of the SHGs visited a government ocer or intervened
8The importance of loans for household needs is in line with Collins et al. (2009), who also conclude that
the demand for microcredit extends well beyond the need for micro-enterprise credit.
9Members do not pay nes in case of circumstances beyond one's control, like for example illness of a family
member.
6directly to solve problems aecting their village. In the area where the survey is conducted,
women rarely visited an ocer before they joined an SHG. If the group decides to undertake
action, on average 75% of the members join.
2.4 Internal versus external accountants
The paper uses an instrumental variables approach, based on the dierent accountant strategies
followed at the eld locations where the survey is conducted.
PRADAN started its SHG activities in the state of Jharkhand in the early '90s. As they
did not nd literate women in a number of SHGs, and as there was a request for employment by
villagers, the practice of a cluster accountant system - where the same accountant serves several
groups - developed.10 The motivation was that accountants could earn an attractive amount of
money if they serve several groups. Their stability would be increased and some employment
would be created. This made it dicult for women to become external accountants, as it is
not usual for them to travel alone between villages. Thus, external accountants were, and are,
predominantly male. Even if newly created SHGs have educated members, the eld teams
in Jharkhand recommend external accountants. The group accepts the recommendation in
most, but not all, cases.11
The approach is dierent in the survey districts of Orissa and Chhattisgarh, where
bookkeeping for a group is initially done by a PRADAN employee. Once the functioning of
the group is clear to all members, the employee asks whether one of the members is interested
in becoming the accountant. This women has to follow a short period of training and her
abilities are tested. Being the accountant does not involve any work outside the meetings, as
dierent members, who are not the accountant, should keep the records and the cash box.
Descriptive statistics on internal versus external accountants are given in Table 3. 822
(50.2%) of the SHGs have an internal accountant and 814 (49.8%) an external one. But,
as external accountants serve several groups, I have information on 473 dierent external
accountants only. External accountants are mainly men who do not necessarily live in the
village where the meetings take place.12 They are more likely to be paid and are paid slightly
more than internal accountants.
10A cluster consists of several villages. All villages within a cluster are served by the same PRADAN
executive.
11Members might for example prefer a person of a particular caste.
12Indeed I shall refer to the external accountant as \he" even though there can be female external accoun-
tants.
7Table 3: Internal versus external accountants
External Internal Dierence
Number of accountants 473 814
Accountant is a woman (%) 22.6 100.0 77.4***
(0.42) (0.0) (1.5)
Average education level (years) 9.5 9.0 0.5***
(2.4) (2.1) (13.0)
Average age 30.9 29.4 1.5***
(10.6) (7.0) (0.49)
Average distance to the village (km) 0.5 0.0 0.5***
(2.5) (0.0) (0.09)
Accountant is paid (%) 58.9 15.0 43.9***
(49.3) (35.7) (2.4)
Salary per week if accountant is paid (Rs.) 11.2 8.8 2.4***
(6.5) (5.8) (0.72)
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3 Empirical methodology
3.1 Group level: instrumental variables
Consider the following OLS regression to estimate how having an internal accountant aects
group level performance variables, such as obtaining a bank loan or not:
yi = 1 + 2Ai + 3Gi + i (1)
Ai is a dummy indicating whether group i has an internal accountant and Gi are control
variables for the SHG. Groups can have an internal accountant only if one of the members is
literate. About the educational requirements, PRADAN says \The accountant needs to have
enough numerical skills and literacy to write the RMTS13 and simple minutes. Anyone who
has the literacy and numeracy skills equivalent to a Class V pass person should be able to do
this." This condition being fullled does not necessarily imply that groups choose internal
accountants. For example, a disagreement about who of the literate members should do
the bookkeeping might lead to an external accountant. As I cannot control for these types
of group characteristics, OLS regression estimates are likely to be inconsistent. To address
this problem, I develop an instrumental variables strategy based on the dierent accountant
13RMTS stands for Regular Meeting Transaction Statement, it is the book provided by PRADAN in which
the nancial transactions are written down during the meetings (savings, loans, reimbursements, etc.)
8strategies that PRADAN followed at the eld locations where the survey is conducted. In
Jharkhand, the practice of a cluster accountant system, where the same accountant serves
several groups, developed. In Orissa and Chhattisgarh the groups were asked whether one
of the members could help in keeping the books (See Section 2.4).
The dierence in approach should lead to a higher probability of having an internal accoun-
tant in Orissa and Chhattisgarh than in Jharkhand. Figure 1 shows the percentage of internal
accountants by the education level of the highest educated group member at the inception of
the SHG. I look at the highest educated member only, as having one well educated member is
a sucient condition to consider an internal accountant. The probability of having an internal
accountant is indeed always higher in Orissa and Chhattisgarh than in Jharkhand.
Figure 1: Percentage of SHGs having an internal accountant per highest education level in
















The graph shows that the threshold of having nished primary education (class 5), as
PRADAN advised, is not a strict requirement for becoming the accountant.14 If the highest
14For Chhattisgarh, the upward trend seemingly starts from class 3 and for Orissa from class 6. Still, I keep
the threshold at class 5. Firstly, only few groups have class 3 and class 4 as the highest education level (25 in
9educated member at least nished primary school, 21.4% of the groups do not have an internal
accountant in Orissa and Chhattisgarh and 19.8% do have one in Jharkhand. Furthermore,
some members became the group accountant without having nished primary school: 5.8% of
these groups have an internal accountant in Orissa and Chhattisgarh, and 0.4% in Jharkhand.15
As PRADAN provides training and tests their skills, these members should be able to keep
the books. Therefore, I also use a less demanding educational requirement, namely that the
group can have an internal accountant if one member is able to read and write. Figure 2 shows
that, conditional on having a member being able to read and write, SHGs in Jharkhand are
much less likely to have an internal accountant.
Figure 2: Percentage of SHGs having an internal accountant if at least one member could read














To obtain a consistent estimator of  in (1), I have two dierent instruments for which I
total) as opposed to class 5 (114 groups). Secondly, primary schools, which are available in most villages, teach
up to class 5. A change of school and likely even of the village where school is attended might be necessary to
start middle school (class 6 to 8). This might discourage parents from sending their girls for education above
class 5 and motivated PRADAN to put the qualication level \so low".
15For example, some muslims did not receive formal education, but were educated at home.
10run the following rst stages:16
Ai1 = 1 + 2(IOR=CHi  Ieducation>=5i) + 3IORi + 4ICHi + 5Ieducation>=5i + 6Gi + i
Ai2 = 1 + 2(IOR=CHi  Ireadwritei) + 3IORi + 4ICHi + 5Ireadwritei + 6Gi + i
The rst instrument (IOR=CHi  Ieducation>=5i) is the interaction of a dummy indicating that
group i is created in Orissa or Chhattisgarh and a dummy indicating that the highest educated
member has at least 5 years of education. The second instrument (IOR=CHiIreadwritei) replaces
the educational requirement by that of having at least one member being able to read and
write. These regressions are given in Table 12 in the appendix. I use the parameters to predict
whether the group has an internal accountant ^ Ai, and estimate consistent estimators for
yi = 1 + 2 ^ Ai1 + 3IORi + 4ICHi + 5Ieducation>=5i + 6Gi + i
yi = 1 + 2 ^ Ai2 + 3IORi + 4ICHi + 5Ireadwritei + 6Gi + i
The assumption underlying my analysis is that absent the dierence in accountant strategy,
and conditional on the independent variables, the outcomes across SHGs which have at least
one member who nished primary education (who can read and write) and SHGs which do not
have such a member would not have been systematically dierent across Orissa/Chhattisgarh
and Jharkhand. The exclusion restriction is threatened if eld teams brought in other dif-
ferences that inuence the outcomes of interest dierently across states and depending on
education, so that the state and education regressors cannot control for it. This is unlikely to
be the case, especially given the nature of the dependent variables of interest.
For the exclusion restriction to hold, the dummies the instrument consists of cannot be
excluded from the regressions. Education plays a role for the outcomes of interest, but other
measures at the moment the group applies for a loan or distributes prots might be more
important than the condition \having at least one educated member (or one member who can
read and write) at the start of the SHG".17 Therefore, I also run the regressions including
extra measures for education, namely the mean education and the fraction of members who
16I do not combine both instruments as they are highly correlated.
17I dierentiate between the characteristics of the group at the moment the group applies for a loan or
distributes prots and at the start of the SHG, because the bank loan is not obtained until on average 20
months and the rst prots are not distributed before on average 2 years. By then the composition of the
group might have changed, as some members join and others leave.
A possible worry is that an internal accountant might attract other educated villagers to join the group and
that the less educated ones might leave. To exclude this possibility, I compare the fraction of educated members
at the moment the group is created and at the moment the group received a bank loan. The dierence is not
statistically signicant.
11can read and write.
Other group controls included are the fraction of scheduled castes, other backward castes and
forward castes in the group (the excluded category is the fraction of scheduled tribes), the
caste category fragmentation index, mean land (in acres), mean age, the average number of
children members have, the fraction of members who have a relative in the group, the fraction
of members who are separated from their husband, the total number of members, and nally,
the squared total number of members. I also included some village controls, namely the
distance to the closest commercial bank, the fraction of households having an adult member
who can read and write, and the number of other SHGs in the same village.
3.2 Member level: group xed eects
To investigate the probability that the accountant herself takes a larger share of the nancial
benets, I run SHG xed eects regressions of the member's share in the bank loan and prots




The group level descriptive statistics, organized by state, are given in Table 4. As the ac-
countant strategy was similar in Orissa and Chhattisgarh, I provide their descriptive statistics
together. There are 1,632 groups in the sample.
In terms of demographic characteristics, members are, on average, more educated in Orissa
and Chhattisgarh. They are mainly scheduled tribes, as compared to other backward castes
in Jharkhand. As the NGO started working in Jharkhand, groups have been meeting for a
longer time. This should not hamper the analysis, as I mainly consider the composition of the
group at the moment it received a rst bank loan or distributed prots, which is, on average,
within the rst two years.
4.2 Member level
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics by accountant status for the 15,659 members who belong
to a group at the moment of the rst bank loan distribution. Accountants receive a larger
share of the bank loan and prots, are better educated and own slightly more land.
12Table 4: Descriptive statistics at the group level
Jharkhand Orissa + Chhattisgarh All Dierence
Number of groups 544 1,088 1,632
(%) (33.3) (66.7)
Dependent variables
The group received a bank loan (%) 64.7 70.2 68.4 -5.5**
(47.8) (45.7) (46.5) (2.4)
Amount of bank loan per member (Rs.) 2,136 1,340 1,591 796***
(2,461) (1,299) (1,788) (113)
Gini coecient of the bank loan allocation 62.0 25.9 37.9 36.1***
(33.0) (29.2) (34.9) (2.0)
The group distributed prot (%) 62.3 46.1 51.7 16.2***
(48.5) (49.9) (50.0) (2.6)
Amount of prot per year per member (Rs.) 187 126 151 61***
(173) (127) (151) (11)
Gini coecient of the prot allocation 12.5 15.5 14.2 -3.0***
(16.9) (15.6) (16.2) (1.2)
Amount of group loan per year per member (Rs.) 1,016 569 714 447***
(891) (604) (740) (37.8)
Gini coecient of the group loan allocation 64.8 47.0 52.8 17.8***
(15.7) (21.7) (21.6) (1.1)
Group members helped each other 75.2 45.9 56.0 29.3***
(43.2) (49.9) (49.7) (2.5)
The group visited a government ocer 22.2 58.0 45.6 -35.8***
(41.6) (49.4) (49.8) (2.5)
Independent variables
Mean education (years) 0.8 2.3 1.8 -1.5***
(1.1) (1.8) (1.7) (0.08)
Fraction of members who can read and write 10.7 30.3 23.8 -19.6***
(14.0) (22.1) (21.8) (1.0)
Fraction of members who are ST 0.2 53.2 35.6 -53.0***
(4.3) (38.5) (40.2) (1.7)
Fraction of members who are SC 31.0 12.7 18.8 18.3***
(38.2) (24.4) (31.0) (1.6)
Fraction of members who are OBC 64.2 32.6 43.1 31.6***
(38.9) (35.0) (39.3) (1.9)
Fraction of members who are FC 4.6 1.5 2.5 3.1***
(16.2) (6.1) (10.7) (0.6)
Caste category fragmentation 0.16 0.26 0.23 -0.1***
(0.19) (0.23) (0.22) (0.01)
Mean land (acres) 0.97 1.8 1.5 -0.8***
(1.0) (2.2) (1.9) (0.1)
Mean age 38.2 36.8 37.3 1.4***
(6.0) (5.2) (5.5) (0.29)
Fraction of members who have relative in group 39.4 48.7 45.6 -9.3***
(22.9) (28.3) (27.0) (1.4)
Fraction separated of husband 9.8 9.7 9.7 0.1
(9.1) (10.0) (9.7) (0.5)
Mean number of children 3.7 2.7 3.0 1.0***
(0.75) (0.62) (0.83) (0.04)
Number of group members 17.3 13.3 14.6 4.0***
(3.5) (3.1) (3.8) (0.2)
Average duration of group (years) 6.1 2.9 4.0 3.2***
(3.8) (1.7) (3.0) (0.14)
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. In the last column standard errors are given. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
13Table 5: Descriptive statistics at the member level by accountant status
Not accountant of SHG Accountant All
SHG with external SHG with internal of SHG
accountant accountant
Number of members 8,350 6,819 490 15,659
(%) (53.3) (43.6) (3.1) (100.0)
Dependent variable
Share in bank loan 6.3 6.8 11.3 6.6
(10.2) (8.0) (15.3) (9.6)
Share in prots 6.1 6.7 8.0 6.4
(3.0) (3.4) (4.6) (3.2)
Independent variables
Education level (years) 0.73 2.2 8.9 1.6
(2.1) (3.5) (2.3) (3.2)
No education (%) 86.9 63.5 0.0 74.0
(33.8) (48.1) (0.0) (43.9)
Level of education between class 1 and class 4 (%) 4.2 11.8 2.0 7.5
(20.2) (32.3) (14.2) (26.3)
Level of education between class 5 and class 7 (%) 5.7 12.3 20.4 9.0
(23.1) (32.8) (40.3) (28.6)
Level of education between class 8 and class 11 (%) 2.8 11.4 67.6 8.6
(16.6) (31.8) (46.9) (28.0)
Level of education: class 12, BA or MA (%) 0.4 1.0 10.0 0.9
(6.0) (10.0) (30.0) (9.7)
Share in group educationa 6.3 5.1 34.4 6.6
(13.9) (9.0) (24.0) (13.5)
Able to read and write (%) 10.5 29.0 100.0 21.4
(30.6) (45.4) (0.0) (41.0)
Family member of accountant (%) 6.1 10.8 0.0 8.0
(24.0) (31.1) (0.0) (27.1)
Caste category: ST (%) 21.4 43.8 37.7 31.6
(41.0) (49.6) (48.5) (46.5)
Caste category: SC (%) 24.2 14.6 13.3 19.7
(42.8) (35.3) (34.0) (39.8)
Caste category: OBC (%) 51.9 38.2 44.7 45.7
(50.0) (48.6) (49.8) (49.8)
Caste category: FC (%) 2.5 3.4 4.3 3.0
(15.7) (18.2) (20.3) (17.0)
Land (acres) 1.1 1.8 2.4 1.5
(2.1) (3.3) (4.9) (2.8)
Age 39.2 37.7 30.3 38.3
(10.5) (10.4) (6.9) (10.5)
At least one family relation in the group (%) 41.3 48.1 51.2 44.6
(49.2) (50.0) (50.1) (49.7)
Separated from husband (%) 10.8 9.9 3.9 10.2
(31.0) (29.9) (19.3) (30.3)
Number of children 3.6 2.8 2.0 3.2
(1.8) (1.6) (1.4) (1.8)
aThe member's years of education divided by the total number of years of education of all the group members.
145 Results
5.1 Non-nancial benets
Table 6 gives the impact of the most important independent variables.18 The columns (1) and
(2) show the OLS regressions with a dierent specication for education. The 2SLS regressions
using the requirement that a member should have nished primary education to become the
accountant are given in the columns (3) and (4). The results when using the requirement that
a member should be able to read and write are given in the columns (5) and (6).
Table 6: Non-nancial benets
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mutual assistance between members
Accountant is internal 0.0824*** 0.0871*** 0.1961* 0.2210* 0.1848* 0.2042*
(0.0304) (0.0304) (0.1130) (0.1307) (0.1069) (0.1208)
At least one member nished -0.0156 -0.0597 -0.0514
primary education (0.0333) (0.0489) (0.0452)
Mean education (years) -0.0161
(0.0164)
At least one member can read and write -0.0312 -0.0699 -0.0635
(0.0341) (0.0476) (0.0450)
Fraction members who can read and write -0.0897
(0.1076)
N 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570
SHG undertook collective actions
Accountant is internal 0.1177*** 0.1223*** 0.1835* 0.1798 0.1913* 0.1988*
(0.0301) (0.0300) (0.1105) (0.1268) (0.1039) (0.1167)
At least one member nished 0.0249 -0.0007 -0.0019
primary education (0.0333) (0.0495) (0.0464)
Mean education (years) 0.0024
(0.0153)
At least one member can read and write 0.0105 -0.0168 -0.0143
(0.0340) (0.0487) (0.0467)
Fraction members who can read and write -0.0348
(0.1032)
N 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Group controls included are the fraction of scheduled castes, other backward castes and forward castes in the group, the caste
category fragmentation index, mean land, mean age, the fraction of members who have a relative in the group, the fraction of
members who are separated from their husband, the average number of children members have, the total number of members,
the squared total number of members, the years the group has been meeting and nally the squared number of years. The
village controls included are the distance to the closest commercial bank, the fraction of households having an adult member
who can read and write and the number of other SHGs in the same village. Finally, two dummies indicate whether the group
is created in Orissa or Chhattisgarh.
18The full regressions are given in the Tables 13 and 14 in the appendix.
15SHGs with internal accountants are about 20 percentage points more likely to provide
mutual assistance and about 19 percentage points more likely to undertake collective actions
aiming to solve problems aecting their village. The dierent variables controlling for the
educational attainment of the group are not signicant. Hence, groups indeed do more than
nancial mediation, but it occurs more often when the group has an internal accountant, i.e.
when there is no external involvement.
5.2 Financial performance
To study the nancial performance of SHGs, I look at bank loans, prots and group loans
(See Section 2.3).
For bank loans, I look at the impact of having an internal accountant (as opposed to an
external accountant) on the probability of obtaining a bank loan and on the total amount
received per member. Access to banks appears to be the same in dierent states, as indeed
it should be according to the NABARD guidelines.19 As mentioned before, the accountant's
records play an important role as the bankers look at them to judge the group's nancial
status. NABARD laid down that the size of the rst bank loan cannot exceed four times
the total savings of the group at the time of the application.20 Hence, the credit line is
determined by the savings behavior of all group members. Whether the bank is willing to
lend the maximum amount allowed will depend on the accuracy of the bookkeeping, on the
contact with the SHG representatives and on the internal policy of the bank.21 As the total
amount received is likely to depend on the number of members in the group, I focus on the
size of the bank loan per member.
For prots, I look at the impact of an internal accountant on the probability of having it
distributed at least once and on the total amount a member received per year. SHGs decide
whether they keep the prot in the group box or distribute it among their members. I observe
a large variation in the number of weeks a group has been meeting before they distribute
prots for the rst time. Therefore, to obtain a protability per member that is comparable
across groups, I divide the total amount distributed by the number of members at the moment
of the distribution and by the time since the inception of the group. It is important to remark
that these group level results are not necessarily informative. Groups might have lower prots
because they gave some nancial support to one of the members.22 The group level results
1996.7% of the groups are in villages where at least one SHG opened a savings account in a commercial bank
and 89.8% are in villages where at least one group obtained a bank loan.
20Independent of whether the money is on the savings account or with the members as group loans.
21I only observe the nal amount received (not what the group asked for or could have received).
22For example, a group gave money to a member who had problems in repaying, to take an ill child to the
16are presented, because I look at the allocation within SHGs in the next subsection.23
The rst role of SHGs is building the capacity to save, so members can create a group
fund and provide small loans to one another. Therefore, all groups provide loans from the
group fund, and I focus on the total amount received per member only. The only information
I obtained is the total number and total amount of group loans each member took over the
year preceding the survey, or, for a member who left the group, the year preceding her leaving
day.
Table 7 gives the impact of the most important independent variables.24 Three important
observations can be made. Firstly, groups with internal accountants and external accountants
seem not to dier in terms of nancial performance. Having an internal accountant has no
signicant impact on the probability of obtaining a bank loan or on the average amount
received per member of bank loans, prots and group loans. However, groups with internal
accountants are more likely to distribute prots.
In groups which did not obtain a bank loan or which did not distribute prots, the amount
received per member is zero. This is a reasonable assumption for bank loans, but for prots
it might be problematic, as most groups gather prot, but not all of them distribute it. The
results do not change if I run a restricted sample, including only groups which obtained a bank
loan or distributed prots. This is not surprising for bank loans, given there is no signicant
dierence in the probability of obtaining a bank loan between groups with internal accountants
and external accountants. Table 23, in the appendix, provides an extra robustness check based
on a technique for Tobit models with dummy endogenous regressors which is developed in
Angrist (2001).25 The results are not quantitatively dierent.
Secondly, the mean education level and the fraction of members who can read and write
increase the probability of obtaining a bank loan and the amount of group loans. Finally, the
results of the instrumental variables approaches are not remarkably dierent from the results
of the OLS estimates.
I conclude that groups with internal accountants do not generate a higher value than
groups with external accountants. Hence, if the accountant is compensated based on nancial
hospital.
23Examining the allocation makes sense only if there are no dierences in the amounts distributed between
groups with internal accountants and groups with external accountants.
24The full regressions are given in the Tables 15, 16, 18, 19 and 21 in the appendix.
25I give the estimates using the condition that a member should have nished primary education to become
the accountant. The estimates are computed using a two-step procedure. The rst step is a probit regressing
whether the accountant is internal on the instrument and independent variables. Next, I apply Tobit to the
regression model, adding a Mills-ratio type endogeneity correction from the rst stage.
17Table 7: Financial performance of SHGs with internal accountants versus external accountants
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
The SHG received a bank loan or not
Accountant is internal 0.0214 0.0264 -0.1010 -0.1406 -0.1228 -0.1643
(0.0274) (0.0273) (0.0938) (0.1096) (0.0874) (0.1000)
At least one member nished -0.0171 0.0311 0.0195
primary education (0.0293) (0.0442) (0.0414)
Mean education (years) 0.0240*
(0.0135)
At least one member can read and write -0.0339 0.0260 0.0135
(0.0297) (0.0434) (0.0414)
Fraction members who can read and write 0.1845**
(0.0900)
N 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632
Amount of bank loan received (per member)
Accountant is internal 134.56 146.38 2.41 -122.55 -57.67 -198.96
(110.89) (110.65) (401.84) (466.16) (375.35) (423.69)
At least one member nished 55.32 107.07 73.43
primary education (126.76) (232.16) (217.61)
Mean education (years) 73.70
(49.10)
At least one member can read and write 18.26 99.66 59.36
(131.40) (227.85) (216.73)
Fraction members who can read and write 617.60**
(309.81)
N 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632
The SHG distributed prot or not
Accountant is internal 0.0387 0.0434* 0.2519*** 0.2449** 0.1950** 0.1751*
(0.0244) (0.0246) (0.0909) (0.1035) (0.0865) (0.0974)
At least one member nished 0.0525* -0.0308 -0.0331
primary education (0.0275) (0.0437) (0.0412)
Mean education (years) 0.0046
(0.0127)
At least one member can read and write 0.0391 -0.0209 -0.0267
(0.0283) (0.0428) (0.0410)
Fraction members who can read and write 0.0899
(0.0857)
N 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570
Amount of prot received (per member per year)
Accountant is internal 3.20 3.02 39.98 40.80 25.72 24.22
(7.29) (7.33) (28.08) (32.17) (26.51) (30.00)
At least one member nished 12.17 -2.19 -1.94
primary education (9.37) (17.31) (16.33)
Mean education (years) -0.52
(3.90)
At least one member can read and write 13.16 4.21 3.80
(9.77) (17.04) (16.32)
Fraction members who can read and write 6.59
(25.64)
N 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558
Amount of group loan received (per member)
Accountant is internal 56.27 52.75 209.24 142.10 194.89 123.41
(38.43) (38.50) (162.61) (185.63) (139.28) (157.26)
At least one member nished 112.86** 52.43 33.95
primary education (53.35) (99.86) (94.77)
Mean education (years) 40.17*
(21.29)
At least one member can read and write 128.48** 71.64 55.39
(55.79) (92.73) (89.87)
Fraction members who can read and write 285.70**
(139.77)
N 1,605 1,605 1,605 1,605 1,605 1,605
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Group controls included are the fraction of scheduled castes, other backward castes and forward castes in the
group, the caste category fragmentation index, mean land, mean age, the fraction of members who have a
relative in the group, the fraction of members who are separated from their husband, the average number of
children members have, the total number of members, and nally, the squared total number of members. The
village controls included are the distance to the closest commercial bank, the fraction of households having an
adult member who can read and write and the number of other SHGs in the same village. Finally, two dummies
indicate whether the group is created in Orissa or Chhattisgarh.
18measures of performance, we could not expect her to receive higher compensation than an
external accountant. In the next section, however, I show that groups with internal accoun-
tants distribute bank loans and prots more unequally than groups with external accountants.
Within group regressions suggest that the accountant receives a larger share.
5.3 Allocation within SHGs
5.3.1 The group level
To measure the inequality in the distribution of nancial benets, I calculate the Gini coef-
cient. Table 8 shows that groups with internal accountants allocate bank loans and prots
more unequally. The Gini coecient of the bank loan allocation increases by approximately
17 percentage points and of the prot allocation by about 15 percentage points. There is no
dierence for group loans.26 27
For bank loans and for prots, the regressions are conditional on the group having obtained
a bank loan or having distributed prots. This strategy should be ne for bank loans, given
there is no signicant dierence in the probability of obtaining a bank loan between groups with
internal and external accountants. Furthermore, in Section 5.2 I demonstrated the robustness
of my results to various specications.
The OLS estimates suggest that groups with internal accountants allocate more unequally,
but the impact is not signicant. In Jharkhand, the choice of an internal accountant - when an
external one is recommended - might reect a particular level of consensus within the group.
Indeed, an SHG will refuse a recommended person and put one of its own members forward
only if a minimum level of consensus is reached. Hence, an unequal distribution of benets
within those groups would be surprising, and might dampen the eect on the coecients in
the OLS regressions.
5.3.2 The member level
The group level results suggest that SHGs with internal accountants distribute bank loans and
prots more unequally. Using SHG xed eects, I take a look at the within group distribution
to examine whether the accountant receives a larger share or not. The results are given in Table
9 for bank loans and in Table 10 for prots. The share of the accountant is approximately
3 percentage points larger for bank loans and one percentage point for prots. This is a
26The full regressions are given in the Tables 17, 20 and 22 in the appendix.
27The results are comparable when I use the standard deviation of the share each member received as the
dependent variable. I use the standard deviation of the share, as I do not want the standard deviation to
depend on the total amount the group received. The results are available from the author upon request.
19Table 8: Gini coecient of allocation within SHGs
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank loan allocation
Accountant is internal -0.0003 0.0005 0.1693** 0.1671* 0.1639** 0.1689*
(0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0814) (0.0985) (0.0759) (0.0890)
At least one member nished 0.0826*** 0.0155 0.0150
primary education (0.0268) (0.0470) (0.0442)
Mean education (years) 0.0012
(0.0130)
At least one member can read and write 0.0811*** 0.0147 0.0158
(0.0276) (0.0464) (0.0445)
Fraction members who can read and write -0.0192
(0.0822)
N 1,038 1,038 1,038 1,038 1,038 1,038
Prot allocation
Accountant is internal 0.0030 0.0024 0.1421*** 0.1592*** 0.1360*** 0.1550***
(0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0442) (0.0515) (0.0431) (0.0492)
At least one member nished 0.0085 -0.0381 -0.0317
primary education (0.0167) (0.0244) (0.0228)
Mean education (years) -0.0117*
(0.0068)
At least one member can read and write 0.0103 -0.0352 -0.0281
(0.0169) (0.0242) (0.0230)
Fraction members who can read and write -0.1015**
(0.0481)
N 801 801 801 801 801 801
Group loan allocation
Accountant is internal 0.0025 0.0023 -0.0030 -0.0173 -0.0083 -0.0262
(0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0471) (0.0549) (0.0483) (0.0554)
At least one member nished -0.0180 -0.0158 -0.0194
primary education (0.0147) (0.0183) (0.0172)
Mean education (years) 0.0083
(0.0064)
At least one member can read and write -0.0179 -0.0136 -0.0175
(0.0147) (0.0203) (0.0194)
Fraction members who can read and write 0.0703
(0.0448)
N 1605 1605 1605 1605 1605 1605
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Group controls included are the fraction of scheduled castes, other backward castes and forward castes in the group, the caste
category fragmentation index, mean land, mean age, the fraction of members who have a relative in the group, the fraction of
members who are separated from their husband, the average number of children members have, the total number of members,
and nally, the squared total number of members. The village controls included are the distance to the closest commercial bank,
the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and write and the number of other SHGs in the same village.
Finally, two dummies indicate whether the group is created in Orissa or Chhattisgarh.
20relatively large additional share. If the division was equal, the average member would have
received 7%. So, the accountant receives 43% more bank loans and 14% more prots than she
otherwise would.
Education, whether measured as the number of years obtained (column (1)), the level of
education (column (2)), the member's years of education divided by the total number of years
of all the group members (column (3)), or as being able to read and write (column (4)) has
a positive impact on the share in the bank loan and in the prots.28 Members who belong to
the higher castes (FC) also get a larger share.
5.4 Elite capture in SHGs with internal accountants?
The more unequal distribution and the extra share the accountant receives cannot be explained
by a better nancial performance. In this Section, I try to nd any indication of whether the
accountant uses her position to take some additional benets.
Firstly, one might argue that the accountant is granted a larger share of the bank loan or
prots as a skill premium, i.e. as an allowance for the work done. This would imply that she
receives what she is entitled to. When the PRADAN employee asks whether a member can be
the accountant, she also introduces the possibility to pay her a salary. However, most internal
accountants keep the books without being compensated (see Table 3). But, as all members
have to be available for all meetings (they are ned if they are not) and as being the accountant
does not involve any work outside the meetings, her opportunity cost of being the accountant
is nil. External accountants are mostly paid, as there might be a positive opportunity cost
of the time spent in the group. However, if the internal accountant feels she should be paid
for her eort, she can discuss this with the group. Hence, if the disproportionate share is
considered a reward for work done, I would expect accountants who are paid for their service
- just like external accountants - not to receive an extra share (or at least to get a smaller
extra share). I test this hypothesis in the regressions shown in the columns (5) in Tables 9
and 10. The estimated eect of being paid as an accountant is not signicant.
Next, for bank loans, I compare the total amount allocated among the members with the
size of the loan. When members apply for a bank loan, the amount received is partially decided
by the bankers and might be lower than what they expected. Members can also increase the
amount available in the bank loan fund by drawing money from group savings. Once the SHG
decides to allocate group funds along with the bank loan, group savings can be used at the
28For the level of education, I use 5 categories. The omitted one is not having obtained formal education.
The other 4 categories are not having nished primary education (class 1 to 4), having nished primary
education (class 5 to 7), having nished middle school (class 8 to 11) and having nished higher secondary
school (class 12, B.A. or M.A).
21Table 9: Share in bank loan (SHG xed eects estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Member is accountant 0.0255*** 0.0280*** 0.0305*** 0.0316*** 0.0237*** -0.0102 0.0269***
(0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0086) (0.0108) (0.0079)
Education level (years) 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0029***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Level of education: 0.0154***
between class 1 and class 4 (0.0031)
Level of education: 0.0194***
between class 5 and class 7 (0.0034)
Level of education: 0.0220***
between class 8 and class 11 (0.0045)
Level of education: 0.0514***
class 12, BA or MA (0.0164)
Share in group education 0.0456***
(0.0101)
Able to read and write 0.0181***
(0.0027)
Accountant is paid 0.0100
* member is accountant (0.0209)
Group exhausted bank loan 0.0375**
* member is accountant (0.0147)
Group allocated extra 0.0550***
* member is accountant (0.0187)
Family member of accountant 0.0107***
(0.0034)
Caste category: SC 0.0004 0.0001 0.0012 0.0005 0.0004 0.0002 0.0000
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Caste category: OBC 0.0035 0.0032 0.0045* 0.0038 0.0035 0.0031 0.0030
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Caste category: FC 0.0236** 0.0231** 0.0261*** 0.0247*** 0.0236** 0.0233** 0.0228**
(0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0092)
Land (acres) 0.0006 0.0006 0.0008* 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Age 0.0018*** 0.0017*** 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Squared age -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
At least one family relation 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0007
in the group (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Separated from husband -0.0088*** -0.0087*** -0.0088*** -0.0089*** -0.0088*** -0.0088*** -0.0087***
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Number of children 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Constant 0.0114 0.0117 0.0214** 0.0174 0.0115 0.0112 0.0116
(0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0111)
N 15,623 15,623 15,623 15,623 15,609 15,623 15,623
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
22Table 10: Share in prot (SHG xed eects estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Member is accountant 0.0091*** 0.0096*** 0.0098*** 0.0094*** 0.0097*** 0.0096***
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0026)
Education level (years) 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Level of education: 0.0049***
between class 1 and class 4 (0.0018)
Level of education: 0.0026**
between class 5 and class 7 (0.0012)
Level of education: 0.0041***
between class 8 and class 11 (0.0014)
Level of education: 0.0017
class 12, BA or MA (0.0043)
Share in group education 0.0060**
(0.0030)
Able to read and write 0.0033***
(0.0011)
Accountant is paid -0.0039
* member is accountant (0.0051)
Family member of accountant 0.0037**
(0.0016)
Caste category: SC 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Caste category: OBC 0.0024 0.0024 0.0025 0.0023 0.0024 0.0022
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Caste category: FC 0.0057** 0.0056** 0.0060** 0.0055* 0.0057** 0.0055**
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028)
Land (acres) 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003* 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Age 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Squared age -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
At least one family relation 0.0022*** 0.0023*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0020***
in the group (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Separated from husband -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0012
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Number of children 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Constant 0.0423*** 0.0416*** 0.0435*** 0.0420*** 0.0422*** 0.0423***
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041)
N 12,558 12,558 12,558 12,558 12,558 12,558
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
23discretion of the accountant, and she can take an even larger share.29 If this is the case, I
expect the accountant to take a larger share if the bank loan is completely allocated (66.5%
of the groups), but the largest share if some group funds are allocated along with the bank
loan (17.4% of the groups). I do not have priors about the dierence between the share of the
accountant and the share of the other members if the bank loan is not completely allocated
(16.1% of the groups). Column (6) in Table 9 shows that the accountant's share increases by
3.8 percentage points if the amount is exactly allocated and by 5.5 percentage points if group
funds are used to increase the total amount. The last result implies the accountant almost
doubles her share (as the average share per member is 7% in case of an equal distribution).
Remarkable, there is no signicant dierence between the share of the accountant and the
share of the other members if the bank loan is not completely distributed.
Finally, I examine whether family members of the accountant receive more. Column (7) in
Table 9 and column (6) in Table 10 show that family members receive an extra 1.1 percentage
point share of the bank loan and 0.4 of prots.
5.5 The trade-o between nancial and non-nancial benets
As the group's nancial performance and the allocation of loans and prots are common
knowledge among members, one might expect that members at the bottom of the distribution
induce a conict or leave the group in case of disagreement. As 21% of the members leave
SHGs, it is denitely not a rare event, and a signicant portion of those who left, join another
group (23%).
Table 11 shows that the percentage of members leaving the SHG within 6 months after the
bank loan or the prot distribution is not signicantly dierent between groups with internal
accountants and external accountants (I obtain the same results after 3 months and 1 year).30
The possibility that the accountant uses her position to take some extra nancial benets
cannot be excluded, but this does not induce more members to leave groups with internal
accountants as compared to groups with external accountants. This might be because the loss
in nancial benets is outweighed by the gain in non-nancial benets.
29The accountant is best informed about the nancial situation of the group. Therefore, she can more easily
propose and judge the possibility to allocate group funds along with the bank loan. But at the same time,
she is constrained, as she is largely responsible for the solvency of the group. In the data set, all SHGs which
repaid the rst bank loan, repaid it on time.
30The full regressions are given in the Tables 24 and 25 in the appendix.
24Table 11: Percentage of members leaving the SHG within 6 months after the bank loan or
prot distribution
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percentage of members leaving after the bank loan distribution
Accountant is internal 0.0046 0.0049 -0.0075 -0.0043 -0.0103 -0.0083
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0116) (0.0136) (0.0114) (0.0130)
At least one member nished 0.0006 0.0054 0.0060
primary education (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0037)
Mean education (years) -0.0016
(0.0016)
At least one member can read and write -0.0003 0.0059 0.0063*
(0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0038)
Fraction members who can read and write -0.0071
(0.0115)
N 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115
Percentage of members leaving after the prot distribution
Accountant is internal 0.0077 0.0076 0.0053 0.0115 0.0047 0.0102
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0132) (0.0155) (0.0128) (0.0149)
At least one member nished 0.0062 0.0070 0.0093
primary education (0.0048) (0.0069) (0.0066)
Mean education (years) -0.0042*
(0.0023)
At least one member can read and write 0.0064 0.0074 0.0094
(0.0048) (0.0068) (0.0064)
Fraction members who can read and write -0.0292
(0.0187)
N 801 801 801 801 801 801
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Group controls included are the fraction of scheduled castes, other backward castes and forward castes in the group, the
caste category fragmentation index, mean land, mean age, the fraction of members who have a relative in the group,
the fraction of members who are separated from their husband, the average number of children members have, the total
number of members, and nally, the squared total number of members. The village controls included are the distance to
the closest commercial bank, the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and write and the number
of other SHGs in the same village. Finally, two dummies indicate whether the group is created in Orissa or Chhattisgarh.
6 Robustness check on a restricted sample
As mentioned in Section 2.4, a PRADAN employee writes the records during the rst SHG
meetings. As groups are not told about the accountant before their creation, it seems unlikely
that early SHGs are formed by women who wanted to become the accountant in order to use
their position to inuence the group's decisions.31 Conversely, SHGs created later on, within
the same village, know that the selection of an accountant is an integral part of forming a
31Another reason why villagers are unlikely to know about the functioning of SHGs in advance, is PRADAN's
choice of villages where no other NGO worked before.
25group. As a robustness check, I only keep groups that were created in the rst 9 months
of PRADAN activities in the village. This choice is based on the normal evolution of an
SHG: a group is expected to open a bank account 9 months after its creation. Hence, groups
normally do not have contact with banks within the rst 9 months. It is also unlikely that
they distributed prots before.
The government has been providing subsidized loans through various schemes to a re-
stricted sample of SHGs.32 As it is hard to predict whether these groups would have taken
a bank loan if they had not received the subsidy, for the regressions on bank loans, I also
exclude groups whose rst external fund was in the form of a subsidy.
For bank loans, my robustness check drops 845 observations (51,6%), for prots 780 obser-
vations (49,6%) and for group loans 793 observations (49,3%). The only result that changes
signicantly is the impact on the probability that the SHG distributes prot: groups with
internal accountants are no longer more likely to distribute prot. The results are available
from the author upon request.
7 Conclusions
This paper shows that the gain in non-nancial cooperation, thanks to repeated interaction
between individuals, might be hampered when there is external involvement. This implies
that internal accountants provide an extra benet for SHGs, but that benet might come at
a cost: there is evidence that some form of elite capture by the accountant occurs. Therefore,
SHG members seem to face a trade-o between their share in the nancial benets and an
environment that strengthens the occurrence of non-nancial benets in the form of mutual
assistance and collective actions.
An interesting policy test might be providing an accountant training for several group mem-
bers, as this would permit an alternation of the function between members. This is possible
only when enough members passed primary education or are able to read and write. For the
women in my data set, this holds for respectively 19.9% and 22.6% only. If it turns out that
this helps equalizing the opportunities of micronance, it is another incentive to reverse the
remarkable neglect of elementary education in India, as discussed by Dr eze and Sen (2002).
32The subsidy comes through various institutions and in dierent forms. It varies from having to pay back
96% of the total amount received to being freed completely.
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8.2 First stage regressions
27Table 12: First stage regressions
2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Instrument 0.5606 0.4891 0.6155 0.5526
(0.0350) (0.0363) (0.0290) (0.0312)
At least one member educated class 5 or above 0.1326 0.0813
(0.0249) (0.0245)
Mean education (years) 0.0753
(0.0083)
At least one member can read and write 0.1294 0.0870
(0.0251) (0.0253)
Fraction members who can read and write 0.4470
(0.0631)
Fraction of members who are SC 0.0163 -0.0665 0.0229 -0.0355
(0.0429) (0.0429) (0.0421) (0.0426)
Fraction of members who are OBC 0.0539 -0.0698 0.0609 -0.0289
(0.0343) (0.0370) (0.0340) (0.0365)
Fraction of members who are FC 0.3186 0.0510 0.3262 0.1134
(0.1104) (0.1118) (0.1104) (0.1113)
Caste category fragmentation -0.0473 -0.0392 -0.0497 -0.0435
(0.0490) (0.0475) (0.0486) (0.0478)
Mean land (acres) 0.0045 -0.0028 0.0052 -0.0007
(0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0046)
Mean age -0.0030 0.0002 -0.0028 -0.0005
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Fraction of members who have relative in group 0.0563 0.0513 0.0654 0.0589
(0.0354) (0.0342) (0.0350) (0.0343)
Fraction separated of husband -0.0744 -0.0397 -0.0472 -0.0337
(0.1038) (0.1003) (0.1034) (0.1020)
Mean number of children -0.0422 -0.0052 -0.0459 -0.0226
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0156)
Total members 0.0008 -0.0009 0.0033 0.0036
(0.0164) (0.0158) (0.0163) (0.0160)
Squared total members -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Orissa 0.0722 -0.0099 0.0191 -0.0187
(0.0421) (0.0418) (0.0380) (0.0380)
Chhattisgarh -0.0274 -0.0299 -0.0962 -0.1049
(0.0422) (0.0404) (0.0371) (0.0364)
Number of PRADAN SHGs in village 0.0024 0.0025 0.0023 0.0022
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Distance to the bank (km) 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020)
Fraction of households in village which have 0.0634 0.0181 0.0770 0.0472
a member who can read and write (0.0434) (0.0423) (0.0437) (0.0427)
Constant 0.1784 0.0535 0.1507 0.0474
(0.1555) (0.1496) (0.1551) (0.1516)
N 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632
F 257.1 181.6 451.1 313.0
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
288.3 Non-nancial benets
Table 13: Mutual assistance between members
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accountant is internal 0.0824*** 0.0871*** 0.1961* 0.2210* 0.1848* 0.2042*
(0.0304) (0.0304) (0.1130) (0.1307) (0.1069) (0.1208)
At least one member nished -0.0156 -0.0597 -0.0514
primary education (0.0333) (0.0489) (0.0452)
Mean education (years) -0.0161
(0.0164)
At least one member can read and write -0.0312 -0.0699 -0.0635
(0.0341) (0.0476) (0.0450)
Fraction members who can read and write -0.0897
(0.1076)
Fraction of members who are SC 0.1165** 0.1164** 0.1065** 0.1228** 0.1068** 0.1175**
(0.0498) (0.0498) (0.0501) (0.0509) (0.0501) (0.0502)
Fraction of members who are OBC 0.0978** 0.0988** 0.0859* 0.1100** 0.0880** 0.1042**
(0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0440) (0.0465) (0.0439) (0.0451)
Fraction of members who are FC -0.0467 -0.0420 -0.0791 -0.0294 -0.0704 -0.0340
(0.1231) (0.1231) (0.1297) (0.1301) (0.1289) (0.1288)
Caste category fragmentation -0.0166 -0.0153 -0.0122 -0.0131 -0.0115 -0.0121
(0.0596) (0.0596) (0.0594) (0.0595) (0.0594) (0.0595)
Mean land (acres) -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0051 -0.0037 -0.0049 -0.0039
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Mean age -0.0055** -0.0057** -0.0053* -0.0058** -0.0055** -0.0059**
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028)
Fraction of members who have -0.0131 -0.0130 -0.0176 -0.0176 -0.0174 -0.0171
relative in group (0.0448) (0.0448) (0.0447) (0.0448) (0.0447) (0.0447)
Fraction separated of husband 0.2471* 0.2433* 0.2499* 0.2429* 0.2439* 0.2415*
(0.1313) (0.1315) (0.1318) (0.1322) (0.1318) (0.1320)
Mean number of children 0.0513** 0.0505** 0.0560*** 0.0498** 0.0548*** 0.0514**
(0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0211) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0208)
Number of members 0.0018 0.0024 0.0007 0.0014 0.0012 0.0013
(0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0208)
Squared number of members -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Orissa 0.0360 0.0365 -0.0224 -0.0067 -0.0135 -0.0065
(0.0516) (0.0516) (0.0758) (0.0693) (0.0734) (0.0703)
Chhattisgarh -0.2648*** -0.2627*** -0.3131*** -0.3099*** -0.3032*** -0.2985***
(0.0523) (0.0524) (0.0697) (0.0685) (0.0676) (0.0658)
N 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other group controls included are the years the group has been meeting and the squared number of years. Other village controls are
the distance to the bank, the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and write and the number of PRADAN
SHGs in the village.
29Table 14: SHG undertook collective actions
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accountant is internal 0.1177*** 0.1223*** 0.1835* 0.1798 0.1913* 0.1988*
(0.0301) (0.0300) (0.1105) (0.1268) (0.1039) (0.1167)
At least one member nished 0.0249 -0.0007 -0.0019
primary education (0.0333) (0.0495) (0.0464)
Mean education (years) 0.0024
(0.0153)
At least one member can read and write 0.0105 -0.0168 -0.0143
(0.0340) (0.0487) (0.0467)
Fraction members who can read and write -0.0348
(0.1032)
Fraction of members who are SC 0.1444*** 0.1454*** 0.1386*** 0.1362*** 0.1386*** 0.1427***
(0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0490) (0.0493) (0.0490) (0.0491)
Fraction of members who are OBC 0.0679 0.0696* 0.0610 0.0574 0.0620 0.0682
(0.0419) (0.0418) (0.0433) (0.0453) (0.0432) (0.0444)
Fraction of members who are FC -0.1142 -0.1091 -0.1329* -0.1404* -0.1291 -0.1150
(0.0726) (0.0724) (0.0801) (0.0812) (0.0795) (0.0815)
Caste category fragmentation 0.0648 0.0661 0.0674 0.0675 0.0688 0.0685
(0.0566) (0.0565) (0.0564) (0.0564) (0.0564) (0.0564)
Mean land (acres) -0.0091* -0.0089* -0.0098** -0.0100** -0.0098** -0.0094**
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0047)
Mean age 0.0023 0.0022 0.0025 0.0025 0.0023 0.0022
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Fraction of members who have -0.0322 -0.0317 -0.0349 -0.0348 -0.0348 -0.0346
relative in group (0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0438) (0.0438) (0.0439) (0.0439)
Fraction separated of husband -0.0733 -0.0753 -0.0717 -0.0707 -0.0748 -0.0758
(0.1237) (0.1237) (0.1220) (0.1220) (0.1220) (0.1219)
Mean number of children -0.0041 -0.0050 -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0020 -0.0033
(0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201)
Number of members 0.0465** 0.0472** 0.0458** 0.0457** 0.0464** 0.0464**
(0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0229)
Squared number of members -0.0012 -0.0012* -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Orissa 0.6038*** 0.6042*** 0.5701*** 0.5677*** 0.5689*** 0.5716***
(0.0470) (0.0470) (0.0744) (0.0683) (0.0715) (0.0688)
Chhattisgarh 0.3788*** 0.3798*** 0.3508*** 0.3504*** 0.3512*** 0.3530***
(0.0468) (0.0469) (0.0671) (0.0657) (0.0644) (0.0626)
N 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other group controls included are the years the group has been meeting and the squared number of years. Other village controls
are the distance to the bank, the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and write and the number of
PRADAN SHGs in the village.
308.4 Bank Loans
Table 15: The SHG received a bank loan or not
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accountant is internal 0.0214 0.0264 -0.1010 -0.1406 -0.1228 -0.1643
(0.0274) (0.0273) (0.0938) (0.1096) (0.0874) (0.1000)
At least one member nished -0.0171 0.0311 0.0195
primary education (0.0293) (0.0442) (0.0414)
Mean education (years) 0.0240*
(0.0135)
At least one member can read and write -0.0339 0.0260 0.0135
(0.0297) (0.0434) (0.0414)
Fraction members who can read and write 0.1845**
(0.0900)
Fraction of members who are SC 0.1198*** 0.1197*** 0.1307*** 0.1053** 0.1345*** 0.1116**
(0.0437) (0.0437) (0.0444) (0.0446) (0.0443) (0.0445)
Fraction of members who are OBC 0.1239*** 0.1250*** 0.1370*** 0.0995** 0.1418*** 0.1072***
(0.0379) (0.0378) (0.0391) (0.0402) (0.0390) (0.0396)
Fraction of members who are FC 0.3738*** 0.3788*** 0.4078*** 0.3341*** 0.4210*** 0.3463***
(0.0848) (0.0847) (0.0933) (0.0940) (0.0938) (0.0948)
Caste category fragmentation 0.0925* 0.0938* 0.0889* 0.0899* 0.0895* 0.0902*
(0.0509) (0.0509) (0.0510) (0.0512) (0.0512) (0.0514)
Mean land (acres) -0.0096 -0.0095 -0.0082 -0.0104 -0.0077 -0.0099
(0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0091) (0.0083) (0.0092)
Mean age 0.0025 0.0023 0.0023 0.0031 0.0021 0.0029
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Fraction of members who have 0.0358 0.0357 0.0406 0.0411 0.0423 0.0422
relative in group (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0402) (0.0403) (0.0405) (0.0406)
Fraction separated of husband -0.1876* -0.1919* -0.1940* -0.1855* -0.1971* -0.1933*
(0.1091) (0.1091) (0.1091) (0.1088) (0.1092) (0.1094)
Mean number of children -0.0030 -0.0038 -0.0087 0.0016 -0.0109 -0.0032
(0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0189)
Number of members 0.0751*** 0.0757*** 0.0764*** 0.0757*** 0.0776*** 0.0777***
(0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0204) (0.0203)
Squared number of members -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0020***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Orissa 0.3930*** 0.3935*** 0.4568*** 0.4325*** 0.4710*** 0.4556***
(0.0438) (0.0437) (0.0642) (0.0588) (0.0610) (0.0586)
Chhattisgarh 0.4008*** 0.4031*** 0.4518*** 0.4489*** 0.4637*** 0.4555***
(0.0438) (0.0438) (0.0576) (0.0571) (0.0550) (0.0538)
N 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other group controls included are the years the group has been meeting and the squared number of years. Other village controls are
the distance to the bank, the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and write and the number of PRADAN
SHGs in the village.
31Table 16: Amount of bank loan received per member
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accountant is internal 134.56 146.38 2.41 -122.55 -57.67 -198.96
(110.89) (110.65) (401.84) (466.16) (375.35) (423.69)
At least one member nished 55.32 107.07 73.43
primary education (126.76) (232.16) (217.61)
Mean education (years) 73.70
(49.10)
At least one member can read and write 18.26 99.66 59.36
(131.40) (227.85) (216.73)
Fraction members who can read and write 617.60**
(309.81)
Fraction of members who are SC 23.10 24.94 35.86 -43.17 46.73 -30.73
(156.88) (156.33) (149.15) (150.76) (148.76) (146.36)
Fraction of members who are OBC 26.11 30.08 40.25 -74.16 53.08 -62.32
(124.33) (124.16) (125.67) (125.84) (124.86) (122.79)
Fraction of members who are FC 651.26 664.75 686.49 464.18 720.17* 472.33
(415.29) (414.61) (433.49) (425.98) (432.32) (433.15)
Caste category fragmentation 404.86 407.87 401.62 403.63 402.95 404.55
(257.28) (257.30) (254.22) (254.77) (254.66) (255.28)
Mean land (acres) 1.75 2.19 3.28 -3.31 4.74 -2.62
(15.79) (15.61) (16.17) (17.52) (15.91) (17.95)
Mean age 30.94*** 30.64*** 30.72*** 33.11*** 30.33*** 33.04***
(10.12) (10.12) (10.11) (10.19) (10.11) (10.24)
Fraction of members who have 151.78 152.90 156.70 158.83 161.46 161.64
relative in group (159.32) (159.43) (161.26) (162.23) (161.63) (162.24)
Fraction separated of husband -637.33 -643.53 -643.55 -618.88 -649.58 -637.55
(401.51) (401.19) (404.05) (402.96) (401.97) (402.38)
Mean number of children 83.97 81.63 77.90 108.86 71.99 97.71
(63.30) (63.30) (65.47) (67.15) (65.38) (66.40)
Number of members -62.20 -60.19 -61.18 -62.77 -58.22 -57.31
(215.43) (215.24) (215.16) (214.24) (215.29) (214.43)
Squared number of members 2.01 1.95 1.98 2.06 1.90 1.93
(7.34) (7.34) (7.33) (7.30) (7.33) (7.30)
Orissa -338.26 -337.19 -269.85 -341.25 -231.97 -281.56
(224.20) (224.25) (267.75) (247.35) (260.62) (250.66)
Chhattisgarh -552.85** -549.54** -498.28** -504.12** -467.48* -493.11**
(230.12) (230.51) (249.32) (247.89) (244.07) (240.58)
N 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632 1,632
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other village controls are the distance to the bank, the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and write
and the number of PRADAN SHGs in the village.
32Table 17: Gini coecient of bank loan allocation within SHG
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accountant is internal -0.0003 0.0005 0.1693** 0.1671* 0.1639** 0.1689*
(0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0814) (0.0985) (0.0759) (0.0890)
At least one member nished 0.0826*** 0.0155 0.0150
primary education (0.0268) (0.0470) (0.0442)
Mean education (years) 0.0012
(0.0130)
At least one member can read and write 0.0811*** 0.0147 0.0158
(0.0276) (0.0464) (0.0445)
Fraction members who can read and write -0.0192
(0.0822)
Fraction of members who are SC -0.0474 -0.0458 -0.0673* -0.0684* -0.0660 -0.0640
(0.0374) (0.0374) (0.0403) (0.0387) (0.0401) (0.0390)
Fraction of members who are OBC 0.0100 0.0110 -0.0160 -0.0176 -0.0145 -0.0115
(0.0321) (0.0320) (0.0346) (0.0340) (0.0342) (0.0338)
Fraction of members who are FC 0.0992 0.1004 0.0360 0.0331 0.0398 0.0461
(0.0801) (0.0801) (0.0811) (0.0820) (0.0803) (0.0814)
Caste category fragmentation -0.0478 -0.0479 -0.0382 -0.0383 -0.0384 -0.0385
(0.0443) (0.0443) (0.0456) (0.0456) (0.0456) (0.0456)
Mean land (acres) 0.0103 0.0105 0.0089 0.0088 0.0090 0.0092
(0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0075)
Mean age -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0015
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020)
Fraction of members who have -0.0496 -0.0500 -0.0584 -0.0583 -0.0581 -0.0581
relative in group (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0362) (0.0362) (0.0361) (0.0361)
Fraction separated of husband -0.0138 -0.0125 -0.0171 -0.0164 -0.0174 -0.0184
(0.0920) (0.0921) (0.0926) (0.0931) (0.0925) (0.0928)
Mean number of children -0.0174 -0.0179 -0.0081 -0.0076 -0.0088 -0.0096
(0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0177) (0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0174)
Number of members 0.0262 0.0270 0.0247 0.0247 0.0251 0.0250
(0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0169)
Squared number of members -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Orissa -0.2372*** -0.2376*** -0.3292*** -0.3299*** -0.3256*** -0.3250***
(0.0409) (0.0410) (0.0574) (0.0542) (0.0547) (0.0538)
Chhattisgarh -0.4306*** -0.4326*** -0.5052*** -0.5049*** -0.5023*** -0.5023***
(0.0392) (0.0393) (0.0508) (0.0522) (0.0485) (0.0486)
N 1,038 1,038 1,038 1,038 1,038 1,038
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other village controls are the distance to the bank, the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and write and
the number of PRADAN SHGs in the village.
338.5 Prots
Table 18: The SHG distributed prot or not
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accountant is internal 0.0387 0.0434* 0.2519*** 0.2449** 0.1950** 0.1751*
(0.0244) (0.0246) (0.0909) (0.1035) (0.0865) (0.0974)
At least one member nished 0.0525* -0.0308 -0.0331
primary education (0.0275) (0.0437) (0.0412)
Mean education (years) 0.0046
(0.0127)
At least one member can read and write 0.0391 -0.0209 -0.0267
(0.0283) (0.0428) (0.0410)
Fraction members who can read and write 0.0899
(0.0857)
Fraction of members who are SC 0.0489 0.0505 0.0298 0.0252 0.0353 0.0248
(0.0397) (0.0398) (0.0421) (0.0415) (0.0414) (0.0405)
Fraction of members who are OBC 0.1163*** 0.1183*** 0.0934*** 0.0865** 0.1010*** 0.0849***
(0.0314) (0.0314) (0.0335) (0.0338) (0.0329) (0.0322)
Fraction of members who are FC 0.2295** 0.2346** 0.1692* 0.1547 0.1908* 0.1541
(0.1057) (0.1055) (0.1008) (0.1002) (0.1021) (0.1012)
Caste category fragmentation 0.0129 0.0142 0.0174 0.0176 0.0173 0.0174
(0.0473) (0.0473) (0.0481) (0.0480) (0.0476) (0.0474)
Mean land (acres) -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0043 -0.0047 -0.0035 -0.0046
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0034)
Mean age -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0014
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Fraction of members who have -0.0099 -0.0090 -0.0154 -0.0155 -0.0136 -0.0141
relative in group (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0374) (0.0373) (0.0370) (0.0368)
Fraction separated of husband 0.0472 0.0466 0.0552 0.0567 0.0493 0.0497
(0.1098) (0.1100) (0.1118) (0.1116) (0.1108) (0.1103)
Mean number of children 0.0254 0.0245 0.0332* 0.0351** 0.0303* 0.0338*
(0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0173) (0.0173)
Number of members 0.0340** 0.0348** 0.0313* 0.0308* 0.0328* 0.0320*
(0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0167)
Squared number of members -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Orissa 0.4530*** 0.4533*** 0.3436*** 0.3392*** 0.3753*** 0.3688***
(0.0398) (0.0399) (0.0604) (0.0554) (0.0584) (0.0559)
Chhattisgarh -0.0610 -0.0606 -0.1506*** -0.1518*** -0.1232** -0.1280**
(0.0425) (0.0426) (0.0564) (0.0551) (0.0546) (0.0530)
N 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570 1,570
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other group controls included are the years the group has been meeting and the squared number of years. Other village controls are
the distance to the bank, the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and write and the number of PRADAN
SHGs in the village.
34Table 19: Amount of prot per member per year
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accountant is internal 3.20 3.02 39.98 40.80 25.72 24.22
(7.29) (7.33) (28.08) (32.17) (26.51) (30.00)
At least one member nished 12.17 -2.19 -1.94
primary education (9.37) (17.31) (16.33)
Mean education (years) -0.52
(3.90)
At least one member can read and write 13.16 4.21 3.80
(9.77) (17.04) (16.32)
Fraction members who can read and write 6.59
(25.64)
Fraction of members who are SC -0.12 0.21 -3.58 -3.04 -2.18 -2.98
(11.42) (11.38) (11.74) (11.57) (11.78) (11.44)
Fraction of members who are OBC 44.54*** 44.66*** 40.63*** 41.40*** 42.10*** 40.92***
(8.74) (8.74) (8.98) (9.67) (8.90) (9.25)
Fraction of members who are FC 84.55* 84.42* 74.79 76.39* 78.26* 75.59
(47.05) (47.10) (46.95) (44.95) (47.30) (46.25)
Caste category fragmentation 11.29 11.25 11.88 11.85 11.59 11.61
(15.96) (15.95) (15.96) (16.00) (15.86) (15.86)
Mean land (acres) -2.04** -2.02** -2.49** -2.44** -2.32** -2.39**
(0.99) (0.98) (1.09) (1.09) (1.05) (1.08)
Mean age 1.23* 1.24* 1.30** 1.28* 1.28* 1.31**
(0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66)
Fraction of members who have 9.68 9.79 8.81 8.82 9.16 9.13
relative in group (10.20) (10.20) (10.26) (10.27) (10.20) (10.19)
Fraction separated of husband 10.26 11.10 11.37 11.20 11.33 11.37
(32.56) (32.45) (32.64) (32.45) (32.31) (32.27)
Mean number of children 22.01*** 22.02*** 23.36*** 23.16*** 22.89*** 23.14***
(7.12) (7.12) (7.09) (7.48) (7.05) (7.14)
Number of members 13.83*** 13.79*** 13.50*** 13.54*** 13.58*** 13.53***
(4.98) (4.97) (4.99) (4.98) (4.96) (4.97)
Squared number of members -0.37** -0.36** -0.35** -0.36** -0.36** -0.36**
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Orissa 13.74 13.68 -4.95 -4.48 2.13 1.68
(12.19) (12.21) (17.70) (16.08) (17.19) (16.51)
Chhattisgarh -38.29*** -38.73*** -53.50*** -53.39*** -47.91*** -48.25***
(13.80) (13.91) (17.33) (16.93) (16.90) (16.45)
N 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other village controls are the distance to the bank, the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and write
and the number of PRADAN SHGs in the village.
35Table 20: Gini coecient of prot allocation within SHG
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accountant is internal 0.0030 0.0024 0.1421*** 0.1592*** 0.1360*** 0.1550***
(0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0442) (0.0515) (0.0431) (0.0492)
At least one member nished 0.0085 -0.0381 -0.0317
primary education (0.0167) (0.0244) (0.0228)
Mean education (years) -0.0117*
(0.0068)
At least one member can read and write 0.0103 -0.0352 -0.0281
(0.0169) (0.0242) (0.0230)
Fraction members who can read and write -0.1015**
(0.0481)
Fraction of members who are SC 0.0357 0.0357 0.0230 0.0371 0.0228 0.0364
(0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0261) (0.0250) (0.0260) (0.0253)
Fraction of members who are OBC -0.0814*** -0.0815*** -0.0954*** -0.0766*** -0.0949*** -0.0756***
(0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0185)
Fraction of members who are FC -0.1114** -0.1118** -0.1629*** -0.1308** -0.1616*** -0.1247**
(0.0464) (0.0463) (0.0574) (0.0557) (0.0568) (0.0550)
Caste category fragmentation 0.1004*** 0.1003*** 0.0949*** 0.0966*** 0.0951*** 0.0978***
(0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0318) (0.0322) (0.0316) (0.0320)
Mean land (acres) 0.0111** 0.0111** 0.0080 0.0092* 0.0081 0.0092*
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0053)
Mean age -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0020 -0.0015 -0.0021
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Fraction of members who have -0.0236 -0.0236 -0.0209 -0.0201 -0.0211 -0.0202
relative in group (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0221) (0.0224) (0.0220) (0.0223)
Fraction separated of husband -0.0286 -0.0277 -0.0453 -0.0497 -0.0450 -0.0508
(0.0601) (0.0601) (0.0628) (0.0639) (0.0627) (0.0639)
Mean number of children -0.0039 -0.0038 0.0037 -0.0023 0.0034 -0.0018
(0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0098) (0.0103) (0.0097) (0.0101)
Number of members -0.0157 -0.0158 -0.0203* -0.0202* -0.0198* -0.0203*
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0107)
Squared number of members 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0008** 0.0008** 0.0008** 0.0008**
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Orissa -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0760** -0.0680** -0.0731** -0.0674**
(0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0320) (0.0300) (0.0315) (0.0305)
Chhattisgarh -0.0235 -0.0236 -0.0771** -0.0775** -0.0753** -0.0708**
(0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0314) (0.0317) (0.0311) (0.0307)
N 801 801 801 801 801 801
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other village controls are the distance to the bank, the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and write and
the number of PRADAN SHGs in the village.
368.6 Group Loans
Table 21: Amount of group loan received per member
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accountant is internal 56.27 52.75 209.24 142.10 194.89 123.41
(38.43) (38.50) (162.61) (185.63) (139.28) (157.26)
At least one member nished 112.86** 52.43 33.95
primary education (53.35) (99.86) (94.77)
Mean education (years) 40.17*
(21.29)
At least one member can read and write 128.48** 71.64 55.39
(55.79) (92.73) (89.87)
Fraction members who can read and write 285.70**
(139.77)
Fraction of members who are SC -29.22 -26.81 -42.93 -85.10 -40.98 -75.41
(76.04) (75.92) (77.19) (77.62) (77.21) (77.41)
Fraction of members who are OBC 444.05*** 444.39*** 426.45*** 363.90*** 427.20*** 374.74***
(58.06) (58.02) (59.70) (61.35) (59.34) (61.04)
Fraction of members who are FC 441.68** 439.02** 394.43** 269.53 394.12** 278.66
(176.45) (176.57) (176.76) (186.58) (175.67) (186.57)
Caste category fragmentation -129.50* -130.38* -125.12 -123.03 -126.43 -124.97
(78.47) (78.31) (78.52) (78.31) (78.16) (77.95)
Mean land (acres) -12.14** -12.04** -13.80*** -17.35*** -13.70*** -17.00***
(5.08) (5.07) (5.32) (5.54) (5.30) (5.65)
Mean age 4.14 4.27 4.37 5.67 4.48 5.70
(3.69) (3.70) (3.68) (3.78) (3.68) (3.75)
Fraction of members who have -49.54 -48.74 -55.47 -54.51 -54.73 -54.32
relative in group (58.80) (58.76) (58.35) (58.02) (58.29) (58.08)
Fraction separated of husband -383.99** -376.20** -378.46** -364.83** -373.41** -367.98**
(161.71) (161.60) (162.10) (160.61) (161.61) (160.22)
Mean number of children 23.65 24.11 31.02 48.66* 31.17 43.14*
(25.86) (25.86) (26.77) (25.75) (26.60) (25.85)
Number of members 71.15** 70.90** 68.86** 67.58** 68.56** 68.85**
(32.34) (32.28) (32.11) (32.22) (32.08) (32.17)
Squared number of members -1.83* -1.83* -1.77 -1.71 -1.76 -1.74
(1.10) (1.10) (1.09) (1.10) (1.09) (1.09)
Orissa 148.90** 148.22** 67.63 27.56 72.69 52.77
(75.50) (75.49) (111.84) (103.54) (102.25) (99.74)
Chhattisgarh -245.79*** -250.36*** -311.58*** -315.81*** -310.14*** -319.59***
(64.91) (64.93) (93.71) (92.76) (84.65) (83.45)
N 1,605 1,605 1,605 1,605 1,605 1,605
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other group controls included are the years the group has been meeting and the squared number of years. Other village controls are
the distance to the bank, the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and write and the number of PRADAN
SHGs in the village.
37Table 22: Gini coecient of group loan allocation within SHG
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accountant is internal 0.0025 0.0023 -0.0030 -0.0173 -0.0083 -0.0262
(0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0471) (0.0549) (0.0483) (0.0554)
At least one member nished -0.0180 -0.0158 -0.0194
primary education (0.0147) (0.0183) (0.0172)
Mean education (years) 0.0083
(0.0064)
At least one member can read and write -0.0179 -0.0136 -0.0175
(0.0147) (0.0203) (0.0194)
Fraction members who can read and write 0.0703
(0.0448)
Fraction of members who are SC -0.0041 -0.0046 -0.0036 -0.0125 -0.0034 -0.0120
(0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0229) (0.0234) (0.0229) (0.0232)
Fraction of members who are OBC -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0009 -0.0139 -0.0006 -0.0134
(0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0180) (0.0196) (0.0180) (0.0192)
Fraction of members who are FC 0.0102 0.0098 0.0118 -0.0137 0.0131 -0.0151
(0.0454) (0.0454) (0.0468) (0.0474) (0.0467) (0.0474)
Caste category fragmentation 0.0353 0.0352 0.0351 0.0355 0.0350 0.0352
(0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0252) (0.0252) (0.0253) (0.0252)
Mean land (acres) -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0048 -0.0056* -0.0048 -0.0056*
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0029)
Mean age 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0036*** 0.0033*** 0.0036***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Fraction of members who have 0.0270 0.0269 0.0272 0.0275 0.0273 0.0274
relative in group (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0189)
Fraction separated of husband 0.0272 0.0265 0.0270 0.0297 0.0263 0.0276
(0.0589) (0.0590) (0.0587) (0.0587) (0.0588) (0.0587)
Mean number of children -0.0121 -0.0120 -0.0124 -0.0088 -0.0125 -0.0096
(0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0090)
Number of members 0.0291*** 0.0290*** 0.0292*** 0.0290*** 0.0292*** 0.0293***
(0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112)
Squared number of members -0.0007* -0.0007* -0.0007* -0.0007* -0.0007* -0.0007*
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Orissa -0.1949*** -0.1949*** -0.1920*** -0.2000*** -0.1892*** -0.1939***
(0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0317) (0.0291) (0.0320) (0.0309)
Chhattisgarh -0.1043*** -0.1038*** -0.1019*** -0.1024*** -0.0994*** -0.1015***
(0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0303) (0.0302) (0.0304) (0.0299)
N 1605 1605 1605 1605 1605 1605
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other village controls are the distance to the bank, the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and write and
the number of PRADAN SHGs in the village.
388.7 Robustness check for amount received
Table 23: Amount of bank loan received per member and of prot received per member per
year (robustness check using Tobit)
BANK LOAN AMOUNT PROFIT AMOUNT
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Accountant is internal 151.40 -488.16 6.22 78.53
(154.53) (520.64) (14.71) (50.35)
At least one member nished 22.40 134.82 27.25* -0.37
primary education (171.97) (258.22) (16.29) (22.65)
Mean education (years) 124.32** 2.03
(60.59) (6.36)
Fraction of members who are SC 218.96 128.23 15.39 4.76
(223.26) (220.47) (23.50) (24.16)
Fraction of members who are OBC 206.66 62.24 76.17*** 63.85***
(179.19) (183.92) (18.53) (19.60)
Fraction of members who are FC 1226.77** 974.52* 142.74** 116.28*
(538.68) (549.41) (68.29) (67.25)
Caste category fragmentation 564.64* 557.96* 20.28 20.13
(339.40) (337.73) (29.40) (29.37)
Mean land (acres) -12.96 -19.18 -4.24 -5.76
(31.41) (33.10) (3.17) (3.53)
Mean age 57.80*** 61.03*** 4.11*** 4.32***
(14.68) (14.83) (1.23) (1.23)
Fraction of members who have 219.60 240.16 7.51 5.34
relative in group (223.24) (226.21) (19.54) (19.49)
Fraction separated of husband -959.52* -935.77 61.88 66.68
(579.06) (582.07) (61.72) (61.69)
Mean number of children 182.30* 216.76** 45.25*** 49.18***
(95.41) (100.35) (12.79) (13.62)
Number of members 94.19 96.38 38.02*** 37.45***
(258.38) (259.64) (9.96) (9.89)
Squared number of members -1.75 -1.74 -0.96*** -0.93***
(8.72) (8.75) (0.31) (0.31)
Orissa 167.20 273.26 94.05*** 53.27*
(281.94) (313.72) (24.74) (29.77)
Chhattisgarh -119.08 53.24 -109.21*** -140.51***
(295.95) (322.78) (25.38) (30.13)
N 1,632 1,632 1,558 1,558
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other village controls are the distance to the bank, the fraction of households having an adult
member who can read and write and the number of PRADAN SHGs in the village.
398.8 Percentage of members leaving the SHG
Table 24: Percentage of members leaving the SHG within 6 months after the bank loan
distribution
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accountant is internal 0.0046 0.0049 -0.0075 -0.0043 -0.0103 -0.0083
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0116) (0.0136) (0.0114) (0.0130)
At least one member nished 0.0006 0.0054 0.0060
primary education (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0037)
Mean education (years) -0.0016
(0.0016)
At least one member can read and write -0.0003 0.0059 0.0063*
(0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0038)
Fraction members who can read and write -0.0071
(0.0115)
Fraction of members who are SC 0.0127* 0.0128* 0.0141* 0.0155* 0.0146* 0.0153*
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0080)
Fraction of members who are OBC 0.0020 0.0021 0.0037 0.0058 0.0043 0.0054
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0062)
Fraction of members who are FC 0.0058 0.0061 0.0100 0.0139 0.0114 0.0137
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0121)
Caste category fragmentation 0.0042 0.0043 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039 0.0039
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073)
Mean land (acres) -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Mean age 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Fraction of members who have -0.0053 -0.0054 -0.0047 -0.0048 -0.0046 -0.0046
relative in group (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053)
Fraction separated of husband 0.0097 0.0095 0.0101 0.0094 0.0101 0.0098
(0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0154)
Mean number of children -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0017
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0027)
Number of members 0.0075*** 0.0076*** 0.0077*** 0.0076*** 0.0078*** 0.0077***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
Squared number of members -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Orissa 0.0103 0.0104 0.0168* 0.0176* 0.0185** 0.0186**
(0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0095) (0.0092) (0.0094) (0.0093)
Chhattisgarh 0.0182*** 0.0183*** 0.0231*** 0.0225*** 0.0243*** 0.0242***
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0082)
N 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other village controls are the distance to the bank, the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and write and
the number of PRADAN SHGs in the village.
40Table 25: Percentage of members leaving the SHG within 6 months after the prot distribution
OLS 2SLS - education 2SLS - read and write
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Accountant is internal 0.0077 0.0076 0.0053 0.0115 0.0047 0.0102
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0132) (0.0155) (0.0128) (0.0149)
At least one member nished 0.0062 0.0070 0.0093
primary education (0.0048) (0.0069) (0.0066)
Mean education (years) -0.0042*
(0.0023)
At least one member can read and write 0.0064 0.0074 0.0094
(0.0048) (0.0068) (0.0064)
Fraction members who can read and write -0.0292
(0.0187)
Fraction of members who are SC 0.0020 0.0021 0.0022 0.0072 0.0023 0.0062
(0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0098) (0.0107) (0.0098) (0.0105)
Fraction of members who are OBC 0.0014 0.0014 0.0016 0.0084 0.0017 0.0072
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0079) (0.0066) (0.0077)
Fraction of members who are FC -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0006 0.0109 -0.0004 0.0102
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0162) (0.0153) (0.0164)
Caste category fragmentation 0.0225** 0.0224** 0.0226** 0.0232** 0.0225** 0.0233**
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0106)
Mean land (acres) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0007 0.0003 0.0006
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Mean age 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Fraction of members who have -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0041 -0.0044 -0.0041
relative in group (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0067)
Fraction separated of husband 0.0002 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0011 0.0008 -0.0009
(0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0200)
Mean number of children -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0045 -0.0023 -0.0038
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Number of members -0.0085 -0.0086 -0.0085 -0.0084 -0.0085 -0.0086
(0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0131)
Squared number of members 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Orissa -0.0146* -0.0146* -0.0134 -0.0105 -0.0130 -0.0114
(0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0094) (0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0093)
Chhattisgarh 0.0325*** 0.0325*** 0.0334*** 0.0333*** 0.0337*** 0.0350***
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0104)
N 801 801 801 801 801 801
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other village controls are the distance to the bank, the fraction of households having an adult member who can read and write
and the number of PRADAN SHGs in the village.
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